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Abstract. The importance of a security operating system (OS) with security-
enhancing mechanisms at the kernel level, such as a reference monitor and a cryp-
tographic file system, has been increasingly emphasized as the weaknesses and limi-
tation of mechanisms at the user level have been revealed. However, when a system
has only a reference monitor, the system is vulnerable to a low-level detour or
a physical attack. In addition, when a system has only a cryptographic file system,
the file system has a difficulty in protecting itself. To address these problems, we
designed and developed a security OS with a reference monitor, a cryptographic
file system, authentication limitation, and session limitation. Here we describe the
model, its implementation, and its overheads.
Keywords: Security OS, security kernel, access control, cryptographic file system,
PAM
1 INTRODUCTION
Many security breaches have occurred since the development of computer systems.
In addition, as more systems have recently been connected, they have been exposed
to a greater number of dangers. To avoid these threats, technologies such as fire-
walls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and audit trails have flourished. However,
these technologies have their own limitation. For instance, a firewall cannot protect
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a system against an internal intruder. An audit trail cannot prevent an intrusion,
but can only help subsequently trace an intruder by leaving messages. Commonly,
all of these user-level mechanisms cannot protect themselves from being killed by
attackers who already gained an administrator privilege because they all operate at
the user level. In summary, the mechanisms only at the user level are too insufficient
to protect a system and its important data.
These problems lead many researchers and vendors to place a focus on security
OS with underlying mechanisms, such as a reference monitor, and a file system.
The security kernel is one of the main security OS elements and includes a reference
monitor, sometimes termed as an access control, which determines which subjects
can perform which operations to which objects. However, the protection through
reference monitors only has the weaknesses that they have additional overheads and
are vulnerable to both low-level and physical attacks. As an example of overheads,
one of access control implementations requires more than 5% overheads that are
intolerable in some cases (to be discussed in more detail in Subsection 3.4). As
an example of both low-level and physical attacks, if an intruder finds a way to
access information below the level of a reference monitor, then the intruder can
access all information. In addition, if an intruder can detach a disk from a protected
system, physically attach it to another system without a reference monitor, and
mount it, then all information can be revealed.
The protection through a cryptographic file system only has also limitation
when protecting a system and important data. For example, when a system admi-
nistrator privilege is taken by an intruder in the system with the cryptographic file
system only, the intruder will have more chances to read important data through
finding the information on the installed cryptographic file system such as mounted
directories, encryption algorithms, and key information because the system admini-
strator can access all objects in the system. In other words, the protection through
a cryptographic file system only is not enough without strong protection on system
privileges.
Beside these problems, the aforementioned underlying mechanisms cannot pre-
vent the various network attacks. When a user privilege is taken by an intruder
at the system that is protected only by username and password, the intruder can
always connect to the system at any hidden locations and try to do harms to the
system. In addition, when an intruder tries to open many sessions, denial-of-service
is caused and a normal user cannot connect to the system due to excessive overheads.
Many aforementioned problems can be solved by using them together. The low-
level and physical problems of the reference monitor can be solved by using together
the cryptographic file system. In this case, even if an intruder accesses informa-
tion below the level of an access control or steals the protected disk, the intruder
cannot view the information because of encryption. This weak privilege problem of
the cryptographic file system can be solved by separating the security administra-
tor from the system administrator, and giving cryptographic file system privileges
to only the security administrator through a reference monitor. In this case, the
reference monitor minimizes the intruder’s chances to find the information on the
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cryptographic file system even if the intruder gains a system administrator privilege,
and effectively protects the important data in cooperation with cryptographic file
systems. The network access problems of the underlying mechanisms can be solved
by authentication limitation and session limitation. By the authentication limita-
tion allowing the specific user to use the protected system at a specific place only,
the system is protected better because any intruders cannot connect to the system
if the intruders are not at the place. By the session limitation allowing only the
limited number of connection sessions, an intruder cannot open more sessions to the
protected system than the permitted number, which disables the denial-of-service
attack. The authentication limitation and the session limitation are also protected
because the reference monitor hides their information. In summary, when a refe-
rence monitor is used with a cryptographic file system, authentication limitation
and session limitation, these mechanisms complement each other while making the
system more invulnerable to attacks.
We designed a security OS with a new, simple, mandatory, fixed, and fast re-
ference monitor, a cryptographic file system, authentication limitation, and session
limitation. This paper describes the design, the implementation, and the overheads
of our developed security OS for helping and contributing the other development of
the security OS.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 refers to various related works by
other researchers. Section 3 describes our security OS, Section 4 describes the exam-
ple security policy configurations, and Section 5 reports its performance. Section 6
concludes.
2 RELATED WORKS
This section describes PAM [1], Cryptfs [2], RBAC [3, 4, 5], and SELinux [6].
2.1 Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM)
PAM was an application-independent authentication mechanism that was developed
by Vipin Samar and Charlie Lai, and provided a system with the ability to support
various authentication, account, session, and password pluggability features. Login
applications using the PAM operate as shown in Figure 1.
Whenever applications such as ftpd, telnetd, and login require an authentication,
the applications invoke PAM API, which loads appropriate authentication modules
determined by the configuration files. After loading the modules, the authentication
request is forwarded to the loaded modules, which returns the authentication legality
to the requesting application [1].
2.2 Cryptfs
Cryptfs is a stackable cryptographic file system that is a part of the FiST toolkit [7]
and exploits vnode stacking [8] to operate over various file systems. Cryptfs supports
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Fig. 1. PAM architecture
only one cipher, Blowfish [9], and implements a limited key management scheme.
Figure 2 shows the call path of Cryptfs.
Fig. 2. Call path of Cryptfs [10]
Whenever an application or a user makes a request to the file system, the request
is delivered to a vnode level call, which invokes its Cryptfs equivalent. Cryptfs
internally invokes the original file system call through the vnode level calls, and
encrypts or decrypts the contents.
Although Cryptfs is fast and secure because it is implemented at the kernel
level, the protection only through the Cryptfs has the weakness that an intruder
who gains system administrator privilege has more chances to access the protected
information because the system administrator can access all information such as
mounted directories, and key information. In addition, the intruder can stop the
encryption because the Cryptfs has no mechanisms to control the system calls and
cannot protect itself [2]. In other words, the protection through Cryptfs only is
insufficient to powerfully protect a system.
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2.3 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
RBAC was the basic model to be referenced in order to design a reference monitor
in this paper. RBAC supports mandatory control, and dense privilege. Basic RBAC
has the model as shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Basic RBAC model [4],[11]
RBAC has elements such as users, roles, objects, sessions, and operations. A user
represents the person who uses the system. A role has sets of both operations and
objects determined by a security administrator. The role is given to users. A session
represents the connection to a system with some of the roles activated during the
session.
The cardinality between users and roles is many-to-many. In other words, a user
can have many roles, and a role can be assigned to many users. The same principle
is also applied to the cardinality between roles and sessions, as well as between
operations and objects. A session can have many activated roles, and inversely
a role can also be activated during many sessions. More than one operation can be
applied to more than one object. The permutation of operations and objects can
be thought of as a parameter assigned to roles. A role can have many parameters.
A parameter can be assigned to many roles. However, the cardinality between users
and sessions is one-to-many. In other words, although a user can have many sessions,
a session can be involved with only one user.
A RBAC supports role inheritance to relieve the burden of the security admi-
nistrator. Role inheritance supports a role to be created by inheriting another role.
In this case, the derived role has the same sets of subjects’ operations to objects as
those of the base role. A RBAC also supports role constraints to place a restriction
on the activated roles. As examples of role constraints, a mutually exclusive role
constraint guarantees only one of the roles to be activated, a prerequisite role con-
straint guarantees prerequisite roles to be activated, and a cardinality role constraint
guarantees the limited number of roles to be activated [3, 4, 5, 11].
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2.4 Flask Architecture and SELinux
The National Security Agency (NSA) and Secure Computing Corporation (SCC)
developed SELinux (security-enhanced Linux) [6] that implemented a Flask archi-
tecture [12], the goal of which was to support both flexible and transparent architec-
ture for a variety of access controls. This goal was achieved by separating a security
server from an object manager as shown in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. The Flask architecture [12]
If a client wants to access an object, the client first makes a request to the object
manager. The object manager determines whether the access is legal or not after
querying to the security server that determines the legality based on security policies
such as identity based access control (IBAC), RBAC, and type enforcement (TE).
Because the security server can be replaced by another server with a different policy,
SELinux can support all security policies as far as the security server is implemented
while following the predetermined interfaces.
Although the Flask architecture was referenced during the early stage of a refe-
rence monitor, the Flask architecture was excluded because it had additional over-
heads related with communication cost between an object manager and a security
server (this overheads issues will be discussed more detail in Subsection 3.4).
3 ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes an architecture, and an implementation of a Security OS.
3.1 Overall Architecture
The overall architecture is shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Overall architecture
Whenever a user logs into a system, the login applications call authentication
and session limitation to check a user identity, a password, an access location, and
a session count. If the checks are successful and system access is granted, the object
access passes through the developed reference monitor whenever the user accesses an
object through an application. After the reference monitor checks whether an access
is legal or not, it calls the original system call only if legal, which calls the developed
cryptographic file system that encrypts or decrypts its contents only if the system
call is either read or write file operations. Before decrypting and after encrypting,
the cryptographic file system calls the Vnode layer that invokes the functions in the
original file systems such as UNIX file system (UFS) and Network file system (NFS).
Only the reference monitor was firstly considered as a security OS. However, the
reference monitor could not protect a system from a low-level detour or a physical
theft, and the cryptographic file system was integrated in order to solve this problem.
Also, the reference monitor could not protect a system from network attacks, and
both the authentication limitation and the session limitation were added in order to
solve this problem.
As the data protection examples of this architecture, we can apply a crypto-
graphic file system to the important directory that needs to be protected, and give
object-accessing operations to the users only to the extent that the users require
for their own roles through the reference monitor. When these policies are applied,
the reference monitor allows only specific users to read the important directory, and
an intruder has difficulties in finding read-permitted users to the directory, gaining
identities of the permitted users, and accessing the information on the encrypted
directory. Even if the intruder can steal the disk and attach it to another system, or
detour the reference monitor, the intruder has a difficulty in reading the important
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directory due to the encryption through the cryptographic file system. As the net-
work protection examples of this architecture, authentication limitation and session
limitation allow a user to log into a system in only the case that the user is at
the specific location and the connected number of the user is less than the specific
number. A user cannot log into the system if the user accesses at the not-granted
locations or if the specified number of the user are already connected, which makes
attacks more difficult. Although IP spoofing enables an intruder to deceive his IP
address, the intruder has no method to know the permitted IP addresses because
the directory with the permitted addresses is protected by the reference monitor.
Denial-of-service attack is also disabled because the session limitation makes it dif-
ficult to open more sessions than the permitted count.
The mutual protection is as follows. The reference monitor protects the cryp-
tographic file system by disabling an intruder to access the information on the file
system. The reference monitor also protects the authentication limitation and the
session limitation from being controlled by unauthorized users through hiding their
information. The cryptographic file system protects an object from being accessed
through a low-level detour or physical theft that can avoid the reference monitor.
Authentication limitation disables an intruder to connect the protected system at
the places besides the permitted places. Session limitation disables an intruder to
open many sessions in order to cause a denial-of-service. In summary, the reference
monitor, the cryptographic file system, the authentication limitation, and the session
limitation complement each other to protect a system and precious resources.
We implemented this architecture using a Sun Ultra 10 device with an Ultra-
Sparc-IIi 440MHz CPU with 512KB cache, 256MB RAM, 9GB IDE hard drive,
and running the Solaris 2.8 operating system.
Two architectures could be chosen to implement this system. The first method
was to create a kernel containing new functions. The second method was to add
new functions into a kernel using a dynamically loadable kernel module (DLKM).
Most modern operating systems supported a DLKM. In addition, the first method
was very difficult because most operating systems were not license-free. Therefore,
we chose the second method – the dynamic implementation method. Besides ker-
nel modules, we developed a server daemon and an administration tool for easy
management.
3.2 Authentication and Session Limitation
We used PAM [1] to realize the authentication limitation and session limitation
regardless of applications. The architecture of authentication limitation and session
limitation is shown in Figure 6.
Login applications dynamically load the developed PAM module by the modi-
fied configuration file. After loading the module that includes both authentication
limitation and session limitation, the login application invokes the functions in the
module, which checks a user identity, a password, the client IP address, and the
current session count. If the password is incorrect, the IP address is not permitted;
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Fig. 6. The architecture of authentication limitation and session limitation
or if the session count exceeds the permitted number, then the login is denied. If
the password is incorrect, the IP address is not permitted; or if the session count
exceeds the permitted number, the login is denied.
PAM architecture was chosen because it enabled application-independent au-
thentication. If PAM architecture had not been used, the source codes of the sup-
ported applications should have been searched, and modified to implement authen-
tication and session limitation. Thus, the use of the PAM architecture made us
avoid unnecessary and repetitive works.
The intruder has a hard time in attacking the system because the intruder does-
not know the permitted IP addresses, and finally cannot find the locations with the
addresses. In addition, even if the system administrator privilege is gained by an
intruder, the intruder cannot change the developed PAM module and skip the au-
thentication limitation and session limitation because even the system administrator
has no privileges to the PAM module.
3.3 Cryptographic File System
We used vnode stacking [8] at the kernel level to enhance the speed and the security.
The architecture of the cryptographic file system is shown in Figure 7.
Fig. 7. Architecture of the cryptographic file system
An application or a user accesses a file through a read() system call, which calls
a vnode layer through vn read(). This vn read() invokes the read() entry point in
the developed cryptographic file system that reads from the other file systems and
940 S. Kim, H. Son, S. Han
decrypts the contents. The cryptographic file system has entry points such as read(),
getpage(), write(), and putpage() that operate in this way.
The vnode stacking architecture at the kernel level was chosen because of low
overheads without context switches, support of various file systems, and relative
security of the kernel memory when compared with the user memory. The encryp-
tion units can be only the directories because the mounting points can be only the
directories at the vnode stacking architecture.
As file encryption algorithms for objects, 128 bit Blowfish [9] and Seed [13]
symmetric key algorithms were supported because of their speed, compact size, and
Korean standard when compared with DES [9]. We felt that 128-bit keys were
secure enough not to be broken for several years when considering the current CPU
capacity. The key for the encrypted objects was delivered to the server daemon in
Subsection 3.5 after randomly generated by the administration tool in Subsection 3.5
when a user wanted to use a cryptographic file system. The server daemon received
the key, delivered it to the cryptographic file system, and saved it within a file after
encrypting the received key. Whenever the server daemon was restarted after these
initial processes, it delivered the key to the cryptographic file system after reading
the key from the file and decrypting it without any necessities of receiving the key
from the administration tool again. The encrypted key could be saved in a file
on the disk with the developed security OS. In this case, the encrypted key was
protected by both encryption and the policies of the reference monitor that allowed
only security administrator to read the encrypted key. The encrypted key could be
saved on a different removable disk from the protected disk with the security OS. In
this case, the key was protected by both encryption and the security administrator.
This architecture is the same as that of Cryptfs in that this architecture uses the
vnode stacking, and different from that of Cryptfs in that this architecture can save
its keys in a file on the protected system or on the external storage system under
the encrypted status, and supports a Seed algorithm in order to be used in Korea.
We newly implemented this architecture by adding the encryption and the de-
cryption into lofs [14] because we could get its source codes, easily wanted to manage
keys differently from Cryptfs, and wanted to support Seed algorithm for the usage
in Korea. In addition, the lofs was supported by most of the UNIX.
3.4 Reference Monitor
Figure 8 shows the reference monitor model that was implemented to minimize the
overheads.
This model has the elements such as subjects, permission, types, operations, and
objects. A subject can be a user, a user group, or a process. A subject is similar
to a user of the RBAC model in that the subject is the actor of object access, but
different from the user of the RBAC model in that the subject can be a user group,
and a process besides a user. Permission is the named set of types and operations.
The permission is similar to the role of the RBAC model in that the permission
has a name. An object can be a directory, or a file. This model has many-to-many
Design and Implementation of SOS 941
Fig. 8. Reference monitor model
relationships between permission and objects, and between permission and subjects.
This model has many-to-many relationship between types and operations. In other
words, permission can be assigned to many subjects, and a subject can have many
permissions. Permission can be applied to many objects, and an object can have
many permissions. As an example of this model, if permission has a read operation,
it is applied to /a, and /b objects, and root and test users, then only root and test
users can read /a, and /b files.
The standard RBAC model was firstly considered, but it was simplified and mo-
dified in order to minimize its implementation difficulties and its overheads caused by
its complexity. A session, a role hierarchy, and role constraints were removed in this
model also for simplicity and speed. Session and role constraints were not essential
because we assumed that all users had the constant sets of permission during a long
period. The assumption removed a session concept because a user did not have to
have different roles based on sessions. The assumption also removed the concept
of role constraints because all permission is always activated during a long period.
Without the concept of role hierarchy, permission cannot be created by inheriting
the other permission. Besides this inconvenience of a permission creation, a security
administrator may have to often modify permission because this model does not
support the permission activation based on sessions. As results of the removal of
a session, a role hierarchy, and role constraints, the model is simple to implement,
and fast.
From the viewpoint of security, this model is mandatory because only the se-
curity administrator can set the policies. Even the object owner cannot change his
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or her granted operations without the permission by a security administrator. This
model can support the least privilege through multiple permission assignments to
subjects, and objects although the number of permission may be more than that of
roles in the standard RBAC model.
This model is similar to the DAC model in that a user has permission to objects,
but different from the DAC model in that this model does not maintain the ACL,
has named permission, and is mandatory.
Table 1 shows the types and operations supported by permission.
Types and operations Description
Types INHERITANCE All of the descendant directories and files inherit the subjects
and the operations of the directory with this permission type.
Types ALL All of the users have the operations to the applied objects.
Types OWNER Object owners have the operations to the applied objects.
Types OWNER GROUP Object owner groups have the operations to the applied ob-
jects.
Operations FORK The subjects can create a process.
Operations EXEC The subjects can execute the processes distinguished by the
applied objects.
Operations KILL The subjects can terminate the processes distinguished by the
applied objects.
Operations SETUID The objects can change a user ID.
Operations CHMOD The subjects can change the modes of the applied objects.
Operations CHOWN The subjects can change the owners of the applied objects.
Operations READ The subjects can read the applied objects.
Operations WRITE The subjects can write the applied objects.
Operations LINK The subjects can create hard-links to the applied objects.
Operations UNLINK The subjects can unlink or delete the applied objects.
Operations RENAME The subjects can change the names of the applied objects.
Operations MKDIR The subjects can create descendant directories in the applied
directory.
Operations RMDIR The subjects can delete descendant directories in the applied
directory.
Operations CHDIR The subjects can change a current directory to the applied
directory.
Operations MOUNT The subjects can mount file systems distinguished by the ap-
plied objects.
Operations UNMOUNT The subjects can unmount file systems distinguished by the
applied objects.
Operations MODLOAD The subjects can load kernel modules distinguished by the ap-
plied objects.
Operations MODUNLOAD The subjects can unload kernel modules distinguished by the
applied objects.
Operations ROLE The subjects can change a security policy.
Table 1. Types and operations of the reference monitor
Types are the inheritance or the subject properties of the permission that is
created, and operations are checked actions. There exist types such as INHERI-
TANCE, ALL, OWNER, and OWNER GROUP. INHERITANCE type means that
the subjects and operations to the applied objects are inherited by all of the de-
scendent objects. Even if new permission is applied to the descendant directory,
the INHERITANCE type permission affects together with the new permission. No
INHERITANCE type permission means that the permission affects the descendants
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as far as the other permission is not applied. If an ascendant directory has per-
mission without INHERITANCE and a descendant directory has new permission,
the descendant directory is affected only by the new permission. If two or more
permissions conflict each other, the OR is applied. In other words, if permission
includes a read operation and another permission does not include a read operation,
the read operation is granted by OR. ALL, OWNER, and OWNER GROUP types
represent that all users, owner, and owner group, respectively are the subjects. All
of the operations mean that subjects can do the operations to the applied objects
as shown in Table 1.
Most of the operations such as CHMOD, CHOWN, READ, WRITE, LINK,
UNLINK, RENAME, MKDIR, RMDIR, CHDIR, MOUNT, and UNMOUNT in
Table 1 could be checked also by the cryptographic file system in Subsection 3.3,
but the reference monitor checked the operations because the cryptographic file
system was operated only when mounted, but the reference monitor was always
operated during all accesses and all accesses should be checked.
The implementation of the reference monitor model is logically divided into five
modules: a system call control module, an authentication module, a permission
management module, an audit module, and an access control module as shown in
Figure 9.
Fig. 9. Architecture of the reference monitor
The system call control module stores, hooks, and restores old system calls. In
addition, it provides new system calls that assemble all of the other modules. The
permission management module adds and deletes permission, modifies the types and
the operations of permission, applies objects to permission, and assigns permission
to subjects. The authentication module manages authentication information that
is used for the access control module and is sent by the developed PAM module.
The audit module records all accesses of users. The access control module deter-
mines the legality of an access. These five modules are logically separated just for
understandability, and are included in one file.
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In contrast to the double call architecture of SELinux in Section 2.4, we adopted
this direct call architecture in order to minimize the overheads caused by flexibi-
lity. The implementation consisted of one file without the separated security server,
and had the fixed model. Most of RBAC implementations concentrated not on
compactness and speed, but on flexibility to support various policies. SELinux
was a representative example. In SELinux, whenever a client wanted to access
an object, the client made a request to an object manager, which in turn made
a request to the security server to determine the legality of the access. As a result,
the overheads of SELinux [6] were more than about 5% in the Unixbench [15] case
[6], about 10% in the Lmbench [16] case [6], and about 4% in the kernel compilation
case [6]. Although an object manager maintained the AVC [12] to minimize these
overheads in the double call architecture, AVC was insufficient to minimize all of
these overheads.
3.5 Server Daemon and Administration Tool
For easy administration, we wanted to develop an administration tool on Windows.
However, because the cryptographic file system and the reference monitor were ker-
nel modules that had a difficulty in directly communicating with an administration
tool, and both authentication limitation and session limitation were libraries, an ad-
ditional server daemon needed to be developed in order to communicate with an ad-
ministration tool. The server daemon received a request from the administration
tool and then made a request to the authentication limitation, session limitation,
cryptographic file system, and reference monitor through system calls. Another
role of the server daemon is to periodically call the audit module via a new system
call to obtain success or failure logs in the kernel memory, and to write them to
files.
An administration tool was developed with Visual C++ version 6.0 on Windows
XP. The administration tool received inputs from a user. The inputs were to mount
a directory with Blowfish or Seed, unmount a directory, create permission, change
either its types or operations, apply it to objects, assign it to a user, a user group or
a process, change an access location, or change a session count. In all of these cases,
the administration tool sent messages to the server daemon, which in turn made
a request to the cryptographic file system, the reference monitor, the authentication
limitation, or the session limitation.
The administration tool used an encrypted channel to communicate with the
server daemon. The administration tool was connected with a server daemon after
a handshake that certificated each other, and exchanged a communication key. The
handshake occurred again at intervals of 24 hours and a new key was used for
the later communication. In order to realize these processes, we used OpenSSL
library [18].
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3.6 Module Protection
Since we implemented all modules as a DLKM, a library, and an application to
avoid kernel changes, the modules could be unloaded. However, the operation to
unload our modules should be prohibited to unauthorized users. Thus, modules
protected themselves by hooking an unload system call and creating an unload
permission, P ROOT in Section 4. Only subjects included in the permission could
unload the developed modules. The server daemon itself should also be protected
from being killed by unauthorized users. Thus, the server daemon also protected
itself by hooking the kill system call and using the application-killing operation to
the daemon object.
3.7 Real-Time Monitoring
To immediately notify the security administrators of an intrusion, the developed
security OS supports a real-time monitoring. The administration tool periodically
sends a message to the managed server daemon every 10 seconds. The tool receives
real-time object and system access failure logs, and shows them at the administration
tool. If these require urgent notification, the tool can notify the system administrator
of the situation with a SMS message or an alarming sound.
4 SECURITY POLICY CONFIGURATIONS
Authentication limitation basically controls dtaction, dtlogin, ftp, login, su, pando-
rad, and OTHER services. X window login location is controlled by both dtaction
and dtlogin. ftp, login, and su are the services that their names say, and serve the
clients only with the permitted IP addresses. A pandorad service is the daemon
service that communicates with an administration tool that controls the developed
security OS. OTHER services refer to the other PAM-controlled services. Authen-
tication limitation places no restrictions on the dtaction, dtlogin, ftp, login, su, and
OTHER services. So, these services can connect with any IP address clients as
a default. However, a pandorad service is connected only with an administration
tool having the security administrator IP address, which prevents the server daemon
from being connected with the administration tool having different IP addresses and
protects against attacks imitating an administration tool.
Session limitation basically sets 5 as the maximum session count for every user,
which minimizes the chance of being hacked by internet worms or intruders through
opening too many sessions. Basically, the cryptographic file system is applied to
no directories. But, if stronger security is needed by objects, the cryptographic
file system can be applied to the directory and protect the objects cooperatively
with the reference monitor. Table 2 shows the created permission for the normally
operating Solaris 2.8 system.
These basic policies were created through examining the failed logs after pro-
hibiting all accesses. ALL permission allows any users to freely access objects. It
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Permission Description
ALL The objects with this permission can be freely accessed by anybody.
NULL The objects with this permission cannot be accessed by anybody.
EXEC The objects with this permission cannot be modified, but can be
executed by anybody.
WRITE The objects with this permission can be modified by anybody.
PASSWD RD The /etc/passwd cannot be modified, but be read by anybody.
PASSWD WR Only the subjects with this permission can modify /etc/passwd.
P SETUID Only the objects with this permission can invoke the setuid system
call.
P AUTH Only the objects with this permission can change a security policy
through the added system call.
P CONF Only the subjects with this permission can access the log, and the
configuration files of the developed security OS.
P ROOT Only the root user can execute and terminate the server daemon of
the security OS.
P ALL The security administrator and the server daemon can access any
objects.
Table 2. Basic security policies of a reference monitor
has the ALL permission type, and all operations described in Table 1 except for
MODLOAD, MODUNLOAD, SETUID, and ROLE. It is applied to both / and
/usr/dt/appconfig directories. By this permission, all users can do the permitted
operations to all of the descendant objects as far as the descendant objects have no
other policies because the permission is applied to the / directory and is not the IN-
HERITANCE type. If the other permission is applied to the descendant directory,
ALL permission does not have any influence on the directory. The other permission
is described in Table 2, and the subjects, types, operations, and objects are set in
this way.
5 PERFORMANCE
Additional operation-checking functions were added by the new system calls in the
reference monitor, encryption and decryption functions were added by the vnode
operations in the cryptographic file system, and location- and session-checking func-
tions were added by the authentication limitation and session limitation. Thus, we
had no choice but to increase the overheads at the cost of enhancing a security.
This section describes the additional overheads using the benchmarks, Unix-
bench [15], and Lmbench [16] on a Sun Ultra 10 device with an UltraSparc-IIi
440MHz CPU with 512KB cache, 256MB RAM, 9GB IDE hard drive, and running
the Solaris 2.8 operating system.
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5.1 Unixbench
In Unixbench, system call performs a fixed number of system calls. Pipe throughput
measures the communicating ability through a pipe between processes. Pipe-based
context switching shows the communicating ability between a parent and a child.
Process creation counts the number that a process can fork a child that exits. Execl
throughput replaces a process with a new one. File copy measures the number of
characters copied to a file within a given time. Lastly, shell scripts execute a shell
script via concurrently running 8 processes [6, 15].
Figure 10 shows the Unixbench overheads when the system has only the reference
monitor, both the reference monitor and SEED cryptographic file system, and both
the reference monitor and Blowfish cryptographic file system. All of the numbers
above the bars represent the overheads by percent (%) when compared with the
general system without any developed modules. These overheads were measured
after applying permission of the reference monitor and encryption of a cryptographic
file system to a directory.
Fig. 10. Additional overheads measured by Unixbench when compared with a general sys-
tem
In the system only with the reference monitor, the 1% average overheads were
related with the increased system call overheads by operation check whenever system
calls were invoked. Pipe throughput and Pipe-based context switching invoked
many read/write system calls. Process creation invoked system calls that created
processes. Execl throughput and Shell scripts created additional authentication
information, and invoked both read and process execution system calls during the
measurement. The file copy overheads were low because the buffer size was huge
enough to minimize the system call overheads.
In the system with both the reference monitor and file operation without de-
cryption and encryption, the 4.4% average overheads were caused by one more
vnode layer. System call, Pipe throughput, Pipe-based context switching, and Pro-
cess creation invoked read/write system calls. The average overheads of both the
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reference monitor and file operations with decryption and encryption were 62.1%.
File copy had the most notable overheads among the file operations such as Execl
throughput, File copy, and Shell scripts. During copying files, the reference monitor
should check whether the user had read operation, the original file system should
read its contents, the developed cryptographic file system should decrypt them, and
the reference monitor should check whether the user had write operations, the cryp-
tographic file system should encrypt them, and the original file system should write
the encrypted contents. The other remarkable cases were Execl throughput, and
Shell scripts. These cases were also related with the decryption overheads when
reading files. Comparison of the overheads of Seed and Blowfish showed that the
difference between them was small.
5.2 Lmbench
In Lmbench, simple syscall reads a byte from /dev/zero and writes it to /dev/null.
Simple read and write perform 4 bytes read and write operations. Simple stat
obtains file information without an open operation. Process fork+exit, Process
fork+execve, and Process fork+/bin/sh -c perform the operations written and mea-
sure the time [16].
The Lmbench overheads are shown in Figure 11. All of the numbers above
the bars also represent the overheads by percent (%). These overheads were also
measured after applying permission of the reference monitor and encryption of the
cryptographic file system to a directory.
Fig. 11. Additional overheads measured by Lmbench when compared with a general sys-
tem
In the system only with the reference monitor, the 1.4% average overheads
were related with the increased system call overheads by operation check whenever
system calls were invoked. The overheads of the process fork+exit, fork+execve,
and fork+/bin/sh -c cases were notable. These cases were affected by the system
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call overheads of the reference monitor that created authentication information,
executed a program, and searched the path.
In the system with the reference monitor and file operation without decryption
and encryption, Simple syscall, Simple stat, and Process fork+exit have only the
2.6% average overheads due to one more vnode layer. Simple read, Simple write,
Process fork+execve, and Process fork+/bin/sh -c with decryption or encryption
have 23.5% average overheads. Comparison of the overheads of Seed and Blowfish
showed that the difference between them was also small.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We designed a security OS with a reference monitor, a cryptographic file system,
authentication limitation, and session limitation. The reference monitor was newly
designed and implemented so that it could be fast, simple, mandatory, and fixed
because the overheads of supporting all of the RBAC features and flexibility were
significant. It had RBAC elements, DAC characteristics, and no need to change
OS. The cryptographic file system, authentication limitation, and session limitation
were added in order to complement each other and their overheads were measured.
The average overheads were 1.2% for the case only with the reference monitor,
the average overheads were 3.5% for file operation cases without encryption and
decryption, and the average overheads were 42.8% for file operation cases with
encryption and decryption due to the operation-checking of the reference monitor,
and the encryption and the decryption of the cryptographic file system. In most of
the cases, the overhead was only 1.2% because the file operations with encryption
and decryption were applied to only the very important directories.
We concluded that the advantages compensate for the slight overheads. Our
security OS gives better system protection: i) by the least privilege through the
reference monitor; ii) by making it difficult to steal and access the protected disk
through the cryptographic file system; iii) by making it difficult for an intruder
to access the system in the not-permitted places; iv) by making it difficult for an
intruder to attack a system through opening many sessions; and v) by making it dif-
ficult to unload or kill the developed modules or applications. As a research project,
our model and implementation of a security OS are valuable because, to the best
of our knowledge, they represent the first security OS that has the authentication
limitation, the session limitation, the cryptographic file system, and the reference
monitor.
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